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Benedetto Croce: The Philosophy of History and the Duty of Freedom - Chapter II Benedetto Croce: The Philosophy of History and the Duty of Freedom - Chapter II
by Prof. Ernesto Paolozzi
2013-02-28 10:53:07
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Chapter Two
Aesthetics: The liberation of Art

Croce’s Aesthetics as science of expression and general linguistics, known simply as Aesthetics or Grand Aesthetics, is the work that earned Croce international fame and that, even today, almost a century from its publication, is perhaps his most popular work, at least, outside of Italy. One only needs to run through the best informed and most up to date bibliographical reviews to realize it. From Japan to England, there are a number of translations of this work, and in anthologies of his works devoted to the philosophy of art, this work always occupies a central role. The Aesthetics can be regarded as a milestone in the history of twentieth century philosophy, and in the history of aesthetics in general. It contains in essence Croce’s entire thought and sums up its close confrontation with the philosophical currents of the time. Croce, always ready to historicize himself, gives an account of both issues, in the Preface to the fifth edition of September 15, 1921:

The strength of this first treatment consisted, on the one hand, of a critique of the physiological, psychological and naturalistic Aesthetic in all its forms, and on the other, of a critique of any metaphysical accounts of the Aesthetic, with the consequential destruction of the conceptual errors that they upheld and valorized, against which this work opposed the simple notion that art is expression, expression, of course, which is not immediate and practical, but theoretical, that is to say, intuition. On this clearly established notion, which I have never had any reason to abandon, since it proved to be sound and adaptable, I have not ceased, since then, to define it more precisely. The two main developments I have outlined are: (1) the demonstration of the lyrical character of pure intuition (1908); and (2) the demonstration of its universal or cosmic character (1918). One could say that the first counters any false view of art as realistic or imitative, and the second counters the no less false view of art as unbridled passion or “romantic” effusion. The origins or seeds of both of these developments were certainly to be found in this present book, but no more than as seeds or origins.

Croce expresses himself even more clearly in the Introduction to Guide to Aesthetics (Breviario di estetica) of 1912, a set of four papers written for the Opening of the Rice Institute at Houston University, and which had enormous editorial success. Hoping that the short volume could also benefit Italian students, whom the editor Laterza wanted to target, Croce thought that it would be simpler and more interesting for those who wanted to get closer to philosophical questions, to start with the aesthetic.

The problems of Art lead more easily and spontaneously not only to acquire the habit of speculation, but also to give a foretaste of the logic, ethics, and metaphysics. For in fact, to understand the relation of content and form in art is to begin to understand the synthetic a priori. Similarly, to understand the relation of intuition and expression is to overcome the materialism and spiritualism dualism. To understand the empiricism of the classification of literary genres and of the arts is to understand a glimpse of the difference between naturalistic and philosophical processes, and so on.

The aesthetic is for Croce the testing ground of every philosophy. And, in fact, the fundamental concepts worked out and outlined in his first great book, and always re-examined and better clarified throughout the years, are seminal to understanding the development of his thought and to substantiating the ideological and cultural premises put forward in the first pages of this short work. The Aesthetic begins with this very famous statement:

Knowledge takes two forms: it is either intuitive knowledge or logical knowledge; knowledge obtained by means of our power to create mental representations, or knowledge obtained by means of the intellect; knowledge of individuals, or knowledge of universals; of particular things, or of the relationships between them; it is, in short, either that which produces representations or that which produces concepts.(Ae 1)

In so doing the philosopher states his own position clearly and precisely which, even after many reflections and clarifications, will remain fundamental to its overall philosophical system. Knowledge originates in intuition and this is the form of knowledge of the individual. Above all, we represent the world to ourselves, the “reality” around us, then we understand the relations and the connections that hold together the unitarian (universal) fabric of our experiences. What we see, feel, perceive, in what Croce calls the auroral (i.e. original ) form of knowledge are the images or representations of particular events: the face of an interesting woman, the curious face of a child before a new object, the monotony of a middle class interior, a certain expression of ours in a given moment of our existence, and so on. Only in a secondary, ideal moment, we define what we intuit linking it to a universal concept, qualifying what we represent to ourselves as a practical or theoretical event, useful or harmful, good or bad, and so on.

It is useless to add that the schematization or simplification proposed here has only didactic and popular value because both in Croce’s thought and in reality (which is what matters most) the development and the unraveling of conscience occurs in a much more complex way. But, it is worth emphasizing, even in passing, that Croce’s argument has in common with empiricism, which he opposed, the idea that the origin of knowledge is in sensation (modernly understood as activity productive of knowledge and not as mere, passive, reception and, therefore, as definite image, representation), in the knowledge of individuality. In short, an argumentation, even in the largely tributary Kantian thought, to which Croce (as we shall see with respect to the theory of judgment) may be owes much more than to Hegel.

It may useful in order to uphold this interpretation, to compare the Aesthetic of 1902 to the less well-known beginning of the later Logic.

The premise of logical activity, which is the subject of this treatise, are representations or intuitions. If man had no representations, he would not think; if he were not an imaginative spirit, he would not be a logical spirit either. It is generally admitted that thought refers back to sensation, as its antecedent, and this doctrine we have no difficulty in making our own, provided two things are clear. In the first place that sensation is conceived as something active and cognitive, as a cognitive act; and not as something formless and passive, or active, rather as living and not theorizing activity. In the second place that sensation be understood in its purity, without any logical reflection and elaboration, as simple sensation, and not as perception. The latter, as we shall see later, far from being implied, implies logical activity, or even identifies with it (L 3-4).

Of course, these first Crocean theses, above all that of the Aesthetic, presented various problems that the philosopher will confront, in particular for what concerns the nature of intuition, in the later writings on the philosophy of art. In the first book already, the difference with Kant is, often times, implicitly marked and, in particular, with respect to spatiality and temporality to which one used to link intuitions. An undue relation to which Croce decisively objected. But it is without doubt, as Croce often times recognized, that in the first Aesthetic, the general framework, the language and the style, suffer from the cultural climate of the day, from that positivist naturalism that the philosopher always harshly fought. With time, as we mentioned, Croce developed the concept of intuition. He will specify that the chief character of intuition is knowledge of the sentiment. In Guide to Aesthetics, Croce writes that “what lends coherence and unity to intuition is intense feeling. Intuition is truly such because it expresses an intense feeling, and can arise only when the latter is its source and basis”(25) . This reflection, which tends to substantiate the empty mechanical character of intuition, understood first as mere knowledge of the individual, led to many misunderstandings. The use of the adjective lyric, for instance, to indicate the new nature of intuition, even though Croce made it clear that it was only a synonym of intuition, generated the confusion, not entirely cleared up, that he was a romantic. In actual fact, among the many possible implications, which cannot all be accounted for here, Croce meant precisely that intuitive knowledge is always sentimentally affected, that it is always an expression of an inner state which invests the “content” of knowledge itself. If this were not the case, one would fall back in a kind of empiricism, even if skillful and modern. If we go back to some of the examples mentioned, it will be easy to understand the meaning of Croce’s thought. We spoke of intuition-representation of the face of a woman or of a child, and we added the attributes of interesting and curiousity. Now, if we analyze carefully the cognitive process, we realize that we cannot “know” those faces outside their sentimental determinations (interesting, curious). At best, those faces (or anything else) could inspire indifference, but indifference too is a state of mind, a sentiment. We should not speak, therefore, of a Crocean romanticism but, if anything, of a subjective gnosiologism, if this too were not a reductive formula. In fact, an intense feeling, an intuition which is not an intense feeling, an intuition of something, is an empty abstraction. That is why Croce, like Kant, defines art as a lyrical synthetic a priori.

By intense feeling, one should not understand the show of emotion of a mere psychological or practical order. The contemplated but not lived intense feeling belongs to Leopardi, which is something similar but theoretically less ambiguous than Husserl’s erlebnis, to mention a trend of contemporary philosophy shaped by the same cultural climate. Croce clarifies this concept first, in the essay of 1917, “Il carattere di totalità dell’espressione artistica,” (The totality character of artistic expression), where he speaks of cosmic intuition, and later in Aesthetica in nuce. Many are the meanings that one can attribute to the new definition, and many and controversial are the interpretations. Here it will suffice to allude to the distinction between practical and cognitive feeling through which one knows the world in its individual aspects. So we will understand why intuition has a universal character, even though it is knowledge of the individual, and, therefore, can be intelligible; why we cannot communicate to others our pain for the disappearance of a person dear to us but we can represent it, communicate it as representation. This is how Croce puts it in Aesthetica in nuce:

It is in the difference between feeling as contemplated (poetry, in fact), and feeling as enacted or undergone, that lies the catharsis, the liberation from the affections, the calming property which has been attributed to art; and to this corresponds the aesthetic condemnation of works of art if or in so far as immediate feeling breaks into them or uses them as an outlet. The same difference accounts for that other character (once agin, properly speaking, synonymous with poetic expressiveness), the “infinity” of art which differentiates it from feeling or immediate passion which are finite, and this is also described as the “universal” or “cosmic” character of poetry (Ain 219-220).

Are these shifts from pure intuition to cosmic intuition the sign of clear-cut caesura in Croce’s work? Croce denies it, stating that it is improper to speak of a second or a third aesthetics, but only of developments, refinements and corollaries of the first. Alfredo Parente takes up with great insight the question of the logical status of feeling to which the philosopher will never attribute an autonomous value, a categorical meaning. These are complex and fascinating questions which, however, cannot be the object of a synthetic paper on Croce’s vast production such as this.

It is useful, however, to take a step back to discuss the basic theses of his Aesthetic by trying to capture the “subversive” nature of their pronouncements. Above all the identity of intuition and expression and, as a result, that of intuition and art that seemed to his contemporaries surprising if not paradoxical. If a mood is really known, and fully intuited, it is also totally expressed and represented. Some will say that common experience shows the contrary because it is easy to show that there is nothing more difficult than communicating to others our experiences, emotions, and moods. In fact, it is like that. But Croce differentiates between expression and communication, despite creating new uncertainties and many misunderstandings, supporting the thesis according to which the communication of a certain emotional state, of an intuition, can fail for various reasons, but this does not happen to the expression in and for itself. In order to understand this, it is useful to reflect on one’s own personal experience. What we intuit, what we know, is always expressed, represented at least to ourselves. If things were otherwise, we would not really have knowledge of anything. What could we know if we did not represent it? And what could we try to communicate to others? There would be a dualism between intuition and representation that would dissolve the entire cognitive act. Common experience, or common sense, show us, this time, that Croce’s thesis (and of philosophers in general, from Kant on) is not at all paradoxical and, if anything, what is paradoxical is the criticism moved to that thesis. Naturally, one should not underestimate the effort that sometimes is needed to reach what one usually calls a full expression of one’s moods. Croce accepts this process (in fact, he believes that the ultra-romantic view that holds the contrary is misleading), but he simply reminds us that in this plight what one has difficulty achieving is not the expression but the intuition that one has to define, and which is always already expressed.

Let us move now to the question of the identification of the individual’s intuitive knowledge with art, so far implied as a given. Croce is aware of the difficulty of maintaining that the normal faculty, or function, whereby we represent the world in its individual aspects, is identifiable with the great works of art. But if we look closely, the difference that everyone seems to grasp is not “specific,” but only extensive and empirical. “The intuition enshrined in the simplest popular love song,” writes Croce in the Aesthetics, “which says as much, or little more, than the declarations of love that issue daily from the mouths of thousand ordinary people, can be perfect in the intensity of its humble simplicity, although substantially more limited in its range than the complex intuition enshrined in one of Leopardi’s poems”(Ae 14). If we are allowed a banal example, we could say that between ordinary intuition and great art there is the same difference that exists between a simple arithmetic operation and a complicated algebraic calculation. They are both calculations, even though, apparently, very different from one another.

From what we have said, it is clear that art is an autonomous form (distinct) from other forms or functions of the spirit, that is, of human activity. Art is knowledge but not Logic. Art is feeling but not practical feeling; therefore, not praxis. Naturally, art is inseparable from the remaining activities of man though it differentiates itself from them. In fact, it implies them or it is implied by them. In this sense, and only in this sense, we can speak of pure intuition. Not in a moral or in an aesthetic-critical sense, but in relation to the fact that it is autonomous from other categorical forms.

From the theoretical picture we have drawn so far, many particular doctrines derive as corollaries, often more well-known than Croce’s general theory, because more immediately effective at the level of critical activity. One has just to think of the identity of content and form, which was already asserted by De Sanctis. This is an unquestionable identity because, to put it once again in Kantian language, between form and content there is a synthetic a priori, as we have already seen in the case of the identity intuition-expression. Hence the impossibility of the perfect translation since it is not possible to transfer a “content” in other forms of expression without modifying at least in part that content, for the reasons already given. One more reason to believe that it is not possible to have an objective interpretation of works of art, which has led some to include Croce in the so-called philosophy of hermeneutics, and justifiedly so. Not to mention the importance of the negation of genera and the classification of the arts. These are useful and practical empirical distinctions but useless and often harmful when strictly applied as criteria for judging a work of art. In much the same way one must understand the question of technique which accompanies artistic activity, but does not exhaust artistic expression, which is always a creative and original act. Art is one insofar as it is expression and Croce, beginning with the title of “Aesthetics as Science of Expression and General Linguistics,” identifies it without question with language. With extreme modernity, by identifying language (not single languages, as historically developed) with the expression of intuitive or individual knowledge, Croce liberated human activity from its oppressive conditions.

This is the fundamental point on which I would like to conclude. Croce’s Aesthetic, as his entire philosophy, is a concrete and working philosophy of liberty. In this specific case it was a question of liberating artistic activity from the ties with which tradition, the pedantry of critics, the slyness of false artists, tried and will always try to repress it and force it. A novel, a symphony or a monument are not romantic, classical, baroque, Arcadic, ancient or modern, unless by metaphor. Above all, they are beautiful or ugly, successful or unsuccessful cognitive acts. After a long and bumpy course, full of theoretical difficulties that implicate the whole history of philosophy, one arrives, finally, to a conclusion that may seem simple, and which after all is the task of philosophy: to explain reality and not to replace it with more or less ingenious eccentricities, to find the reasons of what we all observe and know. It is not by chance that Guide to Aesthetics begins with these subtly ironic, but true, words:

To the question, “What is art?,” one could reply in jest - and it would not be a foolish retort - that art is something everybody knows about. As a matter or fact, had we not some inkling already as to what art is, the question itself could not even be raised. For every question entails some notion of what is being asked, implicit in the question and, therefore, qualified and known. (3)

Philosophy of Art and its Criticism

It would not be fair to Croce if we instituted a hierarchy between his activity as critic and as a theorist of art. There is between the two a clear and continuous osmosis, both because the concrete experience of critic suggested to the philosopher problems and themes of general speculation, and because the theory sheds light on the criticism. In the long study process the two attitudes are born, Vichian-like, out of a single birth. Just as his aesthetic pronouncements, Croce’s critical essays have generated polemics, enthusiastic adherence, and sharp rejections: from the initial essays collected in the first four volumes of La letteratura della nuova Italia (Literature of the New Italy)(1914-1940) to those in Poesia e non poesia, (Poetry and Not Poetry) not to mention the reaction generated from his study on Dante, to the studies on Goethe (1919) and on Ariosto Shakespeare e Corneille (1920) where the variations on the cosmic character of intuition are introduced.

In an extended survey of great, small and even unimportant poets of post-unification Italy, Croce fully exercises his taste and even a certain polemical vocation that sometimes even risks excess. There is real harsh criticism of major poets such as Giovanni Pascoli, and disproportionate enthusiasm for minor poets. However, a unified guideline emerges as the essay “Di un carattere della più recente letteratura italiana” (About a trait in the most recent Italian Literature) of 1907, makes clear, namely the opposition between Carducci’s era to the later and decadent period of Pascoli, Fogazzaro and D’Annunzio. Croce’s negative judgment of the latter period reflect his personal taste, his general ideas on the nature of art and, in some ways, the ethico-political beliefs of the philosopher, not yet completely expressed as in the later years of opposition to the Fascist regime, but already evident in many of his attitudes. The fight against aestheticism, sensualism, romanticism, which at a general philosophical level always goes together with a struggle against rationalism and positivism, as we have seen, also applies to his literary criticism.

But beyond the ideological connotations that somehow condition Croce’s thought, some of his pronouncements, even if not always accepted, remain famous, as they are always original, surprising, to the point of always arousing interest and attention. For example, negating artistic value to the first five cantos of Dante’s Commedia, the distinction between the allegorical structure (that is, non poetic, other than art) of the poem, considered a mere, if indispensable, basis on which poetry is generated, and, consequently, the negation of the aesthetic value of allegory. Similar pronouncements undermined many of the taboos of Italian literature, and were a threat to so many pedants and moralists. A sort of ante litteram fight against received ideas. But the arguments set off by Croce’s critical essays were many. Among these, the polemic on Manzoni, at first viewed as a mere moralist caught in a Catholicism verging on conformism, and then partially rehabilitated later. The peremptory condemnation of Leopardi philosopher. The contemptuous slashing of D’Annunzio, defined an “amateur of sensations”. The rejection of the Baroque. The uncompromising criticism of Pirandello as a bad philosopher, and as the poet of the “identity card.” On the other hand, he praised Ariosto as poet of harmony and refined irony. His boundless admiration for Goethe and Shakespeare, and his definite appreciation for Baudelaire and Flaubert. He “discovered” and launched Salvatore Di Giacomo, as a regional and European poet.

Clearly, it is much easier to disagree with Croce’s single critical judgments, tendencies and taste than with his more theoretical pronouncements. His essay on Leopardi leaves much to be desired, so much so that two of the greatest historians of Italian literature, and sympathetic to Croce’s views, Francesco Flora and Natalino Sapegno, re-examined more liberally the figure of Leopardi and his work, qualifying Croce’s judgment of a “strangled life,” which does contain some grain of truth, into the more humanly comprehensible “history of a soul.”

And yet, we must be aware that if we move from the famous definitions, by now well assimilated, to a re-reading of those works, our judgement changes once again. Both because sometimes even the most severe pronouncements appear plausible and because the critical “slashing” seem less final, paired more with adjectives that disturb than with substantial disparagements. Leopardi’s poetry, to return to our example, is salvaged even if his attitude is condemned, which, by the way, is perfectly in line with Croce’s methodology.

To be sure the case of Pascoli, D’Annunzio and Pirandello are different but, even years later, can one deny a certain puerility in Pascoli, the obvious artfulness of D’Annunzio, and even in the case of the greatly acclaimed Pirandello, can one deny a certain tiresome pedantry in trying to “shock” the ladies and the middle class with his vaunting the mutability of the human condition?

Having said this, it is probably also true that some of Croce’s “devaluations” are somewhat excessive. What is astonishing (and, surprisingly, it is very rarely pointed out), it often seems that Croce the critic forgets Croce the theorist, that in some cases the philosopher conducts a type of content-oriented, if not ideological, criticism which, as we saw, is an attitude that he had always harshly combated. It would seem, and the use of the conditional is necessary, that in Pirandello’s case, perhaps the most surprising, (as far as D’Annunzio is concerned, once his rehabilitation is no longer fashionable, Croce’s judgement will be in part softened by the public’s reluctance to read his works) the negative judgement on the derivative philosophy of the Sicilian writer conditions the overall critical judgement, as if Croce could not understand that in some cases “philosophy” is transformed in art, in state of mind, mood. Of course, in most cases, aesthetic judgement is well differentiated from the moral one, even if in the mature phase of Croce’s thought the relation between ethics and art becomes ever narrower without yielding, however, to moralism, or to content. The moral condemnation of decadentism, for instance, goes hand in hand with the aesthetic condemnation of an art that is never fulfilled but gets reduced, in our view, to a relation of mere causality. On the other hand, one ought to better investigate his positive judgement of Baudelaire, the cursed poet par excellence. In the great French poet, Croce finds that special truth of art that is a form of knowledge, which is not always present in D’Annunzio’s provincial imitations. Therefore, there is no moral prejudice.

In trying to classify Croce’s taste, we could set up two groups, on the one hand the poets he loved and on the other those he disliked. From these a common trait emerges, namely a classical, virile taste, a favoritism for great art, for art as expression of the fundamental dialectic of pain and pleasure, as Alfredo Parente has justly noted. An art that resolves in expression, in the poetic image, life’s turmoil, the tragedy of human condition that trouble us from birth to death, and which is not annulment, or rhetorical artifice, or intellectual play. But it is not always like this, because Croce’s judgement often catches us by surprise forcing us to reconsider the composition of the ideal classifications that we have just set up. Fortunately, this occurs because taste is free. Even when influenced it is never conditioned or determined.

Finally, I would like to remember the importance that Croce attaches to the theories of some poets and critics to the study of the history of aesthetics. Naturally, he differentiates between poetics and aesthetic, between the programs, the personal declarations of taste, the poetic manifestoes, from the proper and true analyses of the artistic phenomenon. Nonetheless, Croce discovers in the poetics of Baudelaire and Flaubert elements of the greatest interest, and he even goes so far as to state that in order to attain innovative elements for the history of aesthetic, one must turn, in French culture, to the poets and not to the philosophical tradition, too tied up with Cartesianism and almost made powerless by rationalism. As far as Italy is concerned, he remarks that only Francesco De Sanctis (even if he thinks that the little known Antonio Tari is also important) despite the rhapsodic character of his writings, rises up to the speculative power of a Giambattista Vico, true “discoverer” of modern aesthetics (Baumgarten is a special case that cannot be dealt with here). One could write, as we have suggested elsewhere, a history of aesthetics by non philosophers (that is, non professional ones) from Croce’s point of view. Thus, one could deal in greater depth, and in a less fragmentary way, with the affinities between Croce’s aesthetic of the autonomy of art and French symbolism, the intuitions of E. Allan Poe, the theories of T.S. Eliot, or Joyce’s sensibility (for instance, the aesthetic statements in The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man). From this study, very probably, a view of Croce could emerge that is very current in its conception of modernity, and even post-modernity, in striking contradiction to his language, and life style.

From this point of view, there is something that marks the specificity of Italian culture, and in particular the Southern one, from Vico to Leopardi, from Machiavelli to Croce, from De Sanctis to Gramsci. Southern culture is both cosmopolitan and tied to its traditions, both revolutionary in substance and conservative in its external attitudes, almost as if an instinctive form of modesty made it impossible to our “genius” to take on the character of “immoderation.” Greatness and limitation of our culture.

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The book has been translated from Italian, proofread and diligence in English by Professor Massimo Verdicchio of the University of Alberta, Canada

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Chapter I - Chapter II - Chapter III - Chapter IV - Chapter V - Chapter VI - Chapter VII

 

 


      
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Emanuel Paparella2013-02-28 12:16:29
Dear Ernesto, on this essential chapter of your book which deals with aesthetics, something for which Croce is best known in the Anglo-Saxon academic world, let me comment briefly that indeed great philosophers such as Plato, Vico, Hegel, Tolstoy, Heidegger, Collingwood, Dewey, Gramsci, may and will in fact vehemently disagree on the definition of art and the concept of beauty, if indeed art can be rationally defined at all..., but we do a disservice to each one of those philosophers when we proceed to subsume their thought or filter it via the philosophy of another philosopher which we deem deeper and more encompassing. Unfortunately that is what has happened to Croce who often gets subsumed under Vico or Hegel or closer at home Collingwood and in the process, after his death was first ignored and then almost forgotten.

The merit of your book lies in a fresh presentation of Croce with no filters, unsubsumed, as the unique philosopher of art and aesthetics that he is, to then proceed to the application of such a unique philosophy to our post-modern, post-metaphysical concerns. We may still continue to disagree on the definition of art but we will disagree out of knowledge of the various philosophers of art and not out of confusion and ignorance. Well done and keep up the good work.


Emanuel Paparella2013-02-28 16:53:23
P.S. I also think you have it on target when in the last paragraph of chapter two you define Southern Italian Culture as a paradox of sort, as being both cosmopolitan and tied to its traditions, at the same time. Some may object that such a definition violates the Aristotelian logicl principle of non contradiction, but that can only be said by those who know precious little about Croce’s aesthetic. It is indeed the same problematic found in the poetic philosophy of that other illustrious Neapolitan, in Vico’s concept of Providence which postulates the paradox of transcendence and immanence in his concept of Providence, both poles being present in it at the same time. Indeed the possession of a vivid imagination beyond pure but stale “enlightened” rationalism needed for grasping those paradoxes is something that is highly congenial to the Southern Italian genius.


Leah Sellers2013-03-01 07:02:35
Gentlemen,
Contradiction is at the Heart and Soul of Human existence.
We claim to Love Peace and Harmony, and yet Human Beings are always finding one Reasoning or another to go to War and the State of Chaos with one another.
Being one of those Folks who was born with the ability to sing Opera, write Music and Lyrics, create visual Art, and write Stories, I can attest to the exixtence of Inspired Intuition that is both Enlightened as well as Rational.
Humans are always simultaneously Static and Dynamic. We are a Contradiction within many Contradictions. That's part of what makes all of the Theories and Inquiries of Philosophy and Psychology so titillatingly wonderful and delightfully inspiring.


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